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Casenote

More than Money: Emotional Distress
Damages in Bankruptcy Proceedings

I.

INTRODUCTION

The bankruptcy process is often viewed as purely financial, evoking
images of only dollars and cents, secured and unsecured debts, and
reorganization. However, there is more involved than purely financial
matters. It can be personal, emotional, and leave a lasting effect upon
the debtor's life. Historically, bankruptcy could be devastating to an
individual, leading to public shame and humiliation.' Although the
public is now more accepting of a debtor's plight, it is still a harrowing
experience. Due in part to the sensitive nature of bankruptcy, the
drafters of the Constitution gave Congress the ability to pass uniform

1. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor - and a Modest
Proposalto Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 809-10 (1983). In
ancient Rome, creditors could collect on a debtor's debt by dismembering the individual's
body and distributing it pro rata according to the debt. Id. at 810. In medieval Europe,
a debtor, often faced with criminal penalties, could be subjected to public humiliation
through forced exposure of their naked bodies or a requirement that they wear a garment
denoting them as bankrupt. See James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law
and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1873-74 (1996).
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bankruptcy laws throughout the United States.2 With this power,
Congress drafted the Bankruptcy Code' with a primary focus on
However,
compensation and equitable distribution to creditors.4
Congress also sought to protect debtors by assuring their fair treatment,
especially in Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 Intending to
provide a "breathing spell" to debtors, Congress enacted legislation
requiring an automatic stay on collection attempts following a bankruptcy petition's filing.6 Later, Congress gave teeth to its protection of
debtors by providing a cause of action for "actual damages" resulting
from a creditor's willful violation of the automatic stay.7
A debtor may incur varying degrees of emotional distress from the
bankruptcy process. A creditor's violation of the automatic stay can
exacerbate this stress, and courts have struggled with whether a debtor
may be compensated for this increased emotional distress.' Within the
Eleventh Circuit, courts have routinely held that emotional damages fit
within actual damages; however, a consensus approach has alluded the
courts. 9 The recent decision in Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corporation10 provides a framework from which Eleventh Circuit courts may
approach claims for emotional distress." However, there are still gaps
in the decision and, until those are filled, the ability to recover emotional
distress damages creates a potential for abuse and distortion of the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.

2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Constitution grants Congress the power to pass
uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the United States. Id.
3. U.S.C. tit. 11 (2012). Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to
Title 11 of the United States Code, which is known as the Bankruptcy Code.
4. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6297
(discussing how the automatic stay protects creditors).
5. See id. at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97.
6. See Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991); H.R.
Rep. No, 95-595, at 125-26, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6286-87.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(kX1) (2012).
8. See, e.g., In re Wassem, 456 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). The plaintiffs
have attempted to gain redress for emotional distress under 11 U.S.C. § 362(kXl). See In
re Voll, 512 B.R. 132, 134-35 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2014).
9. See, e.g., In re Wassem, 456 B.R. 566; Bishop v. U.S. Bank/Firstar Bank, N.A. (In
re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003); Poole v. U.B. Vehicle Leasing, Inc. (In re
Poole), 242 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1999); Davis v. United States ex rel, IRS (In re
Davis), 201 B.R. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996); Matthews v. United States (In re Matthews),
184 B.R. 594 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995); Washington v. IRS (In re Washington), 172 B.R. 415
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); Flynn v. IRS (In re Flynn), 169 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
10. 750 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2014).
11. Id. at 1271.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kenneth and Delores Lodge acquired a $156,800 loan from First
Franklin Financial Corporation (First Financial) in 2000. Additionally,
they executed a security deed granting First Financial the right to
foreclose on their property if the Lodges failed to uphold their obligations. In September of 2005, Kenneth Lodge filed a petition for Chapter
13 bankruptcy, and an
automatic stay was imposed on any collection
12
attempts by creditors.
First Financial sold their interest in the Lodges' property to Kondaur
Capital Corporation (Kondaur) which, to no avail, attempted to have the
automatic stay lifted through its legal representative, defendant McCalla
Raymer, LLC (McCalla)."3 In January of 2009, Kondaur submitted a
foreclosure referral to McCalla, who then had a "Notice of Sale" (the
Notice) published in a local newspaper, the Rockdale Citizen. The
Notice, published on March 12, 2009, stated the foreclosure sale was to
occur on April 7, 2009. McCalla requested the notice to be taken down,
and it was after only one day. The Lodges never saw the Notice in the
newspaper. Regardless, Kondaur's actions constituted a willful violation
of the automatic stay. At some time after the publication date, March
12, 2009, the Lodges received letters from attorneys informing them of
the impending foreclosure. However, the purported date of the sale,
April 7, 2009, passed without incident, ending the threat of foreclosure. 14

Pursuant to § 362(k), 15 on March 12, 2010, the Lodges filed a
complaint against both McCalla and Kondaur. The complaint sought
damages for emotional distress resulting from the defendant's willful
violation of the automatic stay. The defendants admitted the willful
violation; however, they contested whether the Lodges deserved
compensation for emotional distress.'

12. Id. at 1264-65.
13. Id. at 1265. In December of 2008, McCalla, then representing First Financial, filed
a motion to lift the automatic stay. Id. After Kondaur acquired the interest, McCalla
amended the motion to indicate that Kondaur was now the owner of the deed. Id. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia never ruled on the
motion. Id.
14. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012).
16. Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1265-66. The automatic stay was continually in force from
September 15, 2005, when Kenneth Lodge filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, to January 28,
2010. In addition, the Lodges alleged that the Notice violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). Id. at 1264; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (2012).
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The Lodges claimed the stress induced by the defendant's actions
caused Kenneth to experience insomnia, migraine headaches, and a
worsening of his pre-existing acid reflux condition. In addition, Kenneth
claimed a loss of productivity at his job and an inability to maintain
personal relationships. Delores alleged that she sought medical attention
for stress-induced insomnia.' 7 The United States District Court for the
Nothern District of Georgia found the Lodges' allegations to be "too
generalized and speculative" to warrant an award of emotional damages
under § 362(k)."8 In addition, the court noted the Lodges' failure to
prove a causal link between the harm and the defendant's actions.
Therefore, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting
their motion for summary judgment on the automatic stay claim. 9
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The primary function of the automatic stay is to protect unsecured
creditors by ensuring equitable distribution of the debtor's estate;
however, the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history also displays an
intent to protect debtors.20 Providing a breathing spell to debtors,
whose perilous finances may permeate all aspects of their lives, in the
form of the automatic stay, Congress sought to prevent harassment by
creditors and limit the inherent stress upon a debtor.2' Congress
granted debtors a cause of action for actual damages incurred due to a
creditor's willful violation of the automatic stay through the addition of
what is now § 362(K).22 The actual damages are meant to compensate
the debtor and make whole any damages incurred due to the willful

17. Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1266.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1266-67. Delores also claimed that she received medication but it was
unclear whether this was for her stress or her pre-existing back problems. Id. at 1266.
20. See H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97; see also Aiello v.
Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2000); S. Rep. No. 95-989 (1978), at 54-55
(1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5787, 5840-41.
21. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 173, 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6134,6296-97; see also

S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 54-55, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41. The creditor harassment that
Congress sought to avoid could take many forms, including abusive phone calls, attacks on
a debtor's reputation, and threatened lawsuits. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 125-26, 173, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6086-87, 6134.
22. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUpTcY 362.12 [31 (Alan M. Resnick &Henry J. Somner eds.,
16th ed. 2014). Subsection (k) of§ 362 was codified as (h) before 2005. Id. The subsection,
enacted as a part of consumer protection amendments in 1984, provides a cause of action
for individuals or natural persons "injured by any willful violation" of the automatic stay
and that any such individual may recover actual damages. 11 U.S.C. § 362(kXl); see also
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 352 (1984).
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violation of the automatic stay." However, a difficult legal question
has arisen as to whether actual damages under § 362(k) encompass
emotional damages and, if so, under what circumstances they should be
granted.
Prior to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Lodge, other circuits confronted the issue of whether
emotional distress damages may be awarded due to a violation of
automatic stay.24 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in Fleet Mortgage Group v. Kaneb, 5 considered the issue and
held that actual damages under former § 362(h)26 encompassed
damages for emotional distress.27 In that case, the First Circuit
affirmed an award to an eighty-five-year old widower who sought
compensation for stress and a decline in social invitations due to the
creditor's willful violation of the stay.28 The emotional distress was
induced by the defendant's initiation of foreclosure proceedings and the
plaintiff's resultant uncertainty regarding his living arrangements. 29
The decision lauded the plaintiff's specific allegations of emotional
distress, as opposed to mere "generalized assertions." 0 The court failed
to comment on the need for corroborating evidence because the
defendant had waived arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence
by not raising them at the lower court level.3 However, the court did
clarify that the mere fact that3 a2 defendant did not act deliberately does
not prevent potential liability.
In Aiello v. Providian FinancialCorp.,33 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a denial of emotional distress
The creditor in the case threatened the debtor, who had
damages.'
filed under Chapter 7, with a fraud claim if the debtor refused to

23. See, e.g., Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1268; Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512,519
(5th Cir. 2008); Dawson v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir.
2004); Aiello, 239 F.3d at 878; Fleet Mortg. Group v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269-70 (1st Cir.
1999).
24. See sources cited supra note 23.
25. 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
26. Until the enactment of amendments in 2005, the language of current § 362(k) was
located in former § 362(h). See supra note 22.
27. 196 F.3d at 269-70.
28. Id. at 267, 269-70.
29. Id. at 269-70.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.(stating courts assume a violation of automatic stay to be deliberate when the
creditor received actual notice).

33. 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 878, 880.
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reaffirm his debt.35 While emphasizing the financial character of the
intended automatic stay protection, Judge Posner's decision stated that
damages for emotional distress were not warranted when the violation
of the automatic stay caused no financial injury.36 The Seventh Circuit
espoused that the relief allowed under the Bankruptcy Code meant to
compensate for financial injury; therefore, the award of emotional
distress damages absent such an injury would distort its fundamental
purpose.3 7 Additionally, Judge Posner expressed concern over the
potential for abuse from the grant of emotional distress damages under
these circumstances.3" Specifically, Judge Posner highlighted the
aggressive strategy pursued by the plaintiff-debtor's attorney as
foreshadowing potential litigious abuse due to the availability of
emotional distress damages.3 9
In Young v. Repine (In re Repine),4" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the claims of a plaintiff-debtor
who was incarcerated when the defendant-creditor, his ex-wife, willfully
violated the automatic stay by attempting to collect child support debt
from the debtor's property.4 1 The court denied the Chapter 13 debtor's
attempts at emotional distress damages due, in part, to the debtor's
failure to provide sufficient "specific information" concerning his alleged
emotional distress.42 In so doing, the court followed Kaneb's emphasis
on the minimum requirement for a plaintiff to provide specific allegations of the emotional distress to receive compensation for a willful
violation of the automatic stay.43
In Dawson v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Dawson)," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the
language of § 362 was ambiguous and looked to the legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Code to determine if actual damages encompassed
damages for emotional distress.45 In this examination, the court
determined that Congress, when enacting the Bankruptcy Code, was not
concerned with protecting debtors from financial loss and non-financial

35.
36.
37.
(legal
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 878.
Id. at 879-80.
See id. at 880-81 (distinguishing Kaneb based on the presence of a financial injury
costs) in that case).
Id. at 881.
See id.
36 F.3d 512 (2008).
Id. at 515-18.
Id. at 521-22 (quoting Kaneb, 196 F.3d at 269).
Id.
390 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1146-48.
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injury as well. 46
Therefore, emotional distress damages may be
considered actual damages, and further, a financial injury was not a
prerequisite for emotional distress damages.47 In addition, the court
provided specific guidelines for the award of emotional distress damages
by stating a plaintiff must (1) prove they suffered significant harm, (2)
clearly establish the harm, and (3) prove a causal connection between
the violation of the automatic stay and the significant harm.4"
Prior to Lodge, the Eleventh Circuit had not addressed the issue of
emotional distress damages for a violation of the automatic stay,
although the issue had been addressed many times in the circuit's
district and bankruptcy courts.4" The prior decisions provided no
consensus approach to emotional distress damages.5 ° The courts agreed
that emotional distress damages fall within actual damages under
§ 362(k) but found inherent difficulties in assessing such claims,
especially when determining the "degree of harm" and the worthiness of
damages.5 1
The requirement for corroborating evidence is perhaps the most
inconsistent element in the cases. In Davis v. United States ex rel, IRS
(In re Davis),52 the United Stated Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Alabama noted that some courts refuse to recognize emotional
distress damages without medical or other types of corroborating
evidence.53 However, at other times, including in In re Davis, courts
accepted the debtor's allegations of emotional distress absent corroborating evidence.5 4 When corroborating evidence was not required, courts
looked at whether the debtor's injury was so readily apparent as to

46. Id. at 1148.
47. See id. at 1149.
48. Id. The case was reversed and remanded for further consideration so that the
bankruptcy court could apply this new standard. See id. at 1150-51.
49. See, e.g., In re Wassem, 456 B.R. 566; In re Bishop, 296 B.R. 890; In re Poole, 242
B.R. 104; In re Davis, 201 B.R. 835; In re Matthews, 184 B.R. 594; In re Flynn, 169 B.R.
1007; In re Washington, 172 B.R. 415.
50. See sources cited supra note 9.
51. In re Matthews, 184 B.R. at 601 (distinguishing cases based on degree of harm); In
re Flynn, 169 B.R. at 1013, 1023 (emphasizing the fundamental debtor-protection purpose
of the Bankruptcy Code and awarding emotional distress damages). Even when courts
denied emotional damages, they still impliedly recognized the validity of emotional distress
damages. See In re Matthews, 184 B.R. at 601.
52. 201 B.R. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996).
53. Id. at 837. The court relied on In re Matthews and In re Flynn, finding that the
debtor's public embarrassment and humiliation did not warrant the $2000 that he sought,

although the court granted $300. Id.
54. See id.; see also In re Wassem, 456 B.R. at 570 (finding that emotional distress
damages were warranted despite lack of medical or corroborating evidence).
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warrant an award of damages. 5 Either the nature of the plaintiff's
injury or the egregiousness of the creditor's actions could support such
an award. 6 In all of these decisions, the courts considered whether a
direct relationship existed between the harm incurred and the actions
of the creditor.5 7
A creditor's actions may independently support the award of emotional
distress damages when the defendant creditor, through harassment of
the debtor or other means, disregards the Bankruptcy Code by committing willful and deliberate violations of the automatic stay.5 8 For
example, a creditor's act of contacting a debtor on forty-four separate
occasions, each constituting a willful violation of the automatic stay on
its own, was sufficiently egregious to warrant emotional distress
damages. 9 Similarly, when a creditor disregards the potential effect
upon the plaintiff-debtor, corroborating evidence may not be required.'e
In these cases, courts focused on the debtor's sense of helplessness when
the means to protect them, the automatic stay, failed.61 However, when
the nature of the plaintiff's injury was the sole basis for an award,
absent corroborating evidence of physical injury or financial injury,
courts highly scrutinized the plaintiff's emotional distress, requiring it
to be more than "fleeting" or "inconsequential." 2
The lack of consistency in the award of emotional distress damages is
3
exemplified by two contrasting decisions, Flynn v. IRS (In re Flynn)"
and Washington v. IRS (In re Washington)," issued on the same day
by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of

55. See In re Wassem, 456 B.R. at 570; In re Poole, 242 B.R. at 112.
56. See In re Wassem, 456 B.R. at 570 (awarding the debtor a total of $4,400 in actual
damages "for significant aggravation, emotional distress, and inconvenience"); In re Flynn,
169 B.R. at 1023 (awarding the debtor $5,000 in actual damages for her "overpowering
sense of humiliation, embarrassment, and shame").
57. See, e.g., In re Wassem, 456 B.R. at 570.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See In re Poole, 242 B.R. at 112. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Georgia found a creditor's action of garnishing a debtor's wages was sufficiently
egregious to warrant damages for emotional distress absent any corroborating evidence.

Id.
61. See In re Flynn, 169 B.R. at 1023. In In re Flynn, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Georgia, noting that the plaintiffs distress "was only
exacerbated by [her) knowledge that she should have been spared these indignities becasue
of the dictates of federal law," awarded $5000 for emotional damages despite the fact that
the plaintiff had "apparently... not suffer[ed] any out-of-pocket medical expenses or longterm physical or emotional harm as a result of the IRS' wrongful levy." Id.
62. See id.
63. 169 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
64. 172 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
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Georgia.65 In In re Flynn, the court recognized the grant of emotional
distress damages in an action against the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) despite the debtor's inability to prove financial loss.' The debtor
claimed emotional distress from having her checking account frozen for
a week, an act that forced her to cancel her son's birthday party.6 7
Meanwhile, in In re Washington, the court denied the debtor's claim,
dismissing any emotional distress incurred due to the IRS's levying of
the debtor's paycheck as "fleeting and inconsequential." 8
In Bishop v. U.S. Bank/Firstar Bank, N.A. (In re Bishop),"9 the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia attempted to
articulate when emotional distress damages may be awarded.7 0

It

stated damages for emotional distress are appropriate when a "natural
and powerful emotional distress," that is not fleeting or inconsequential,
is apparent based on the circumstances or the nature of the wrongful
conduct leading to the violation of the automatic stay.7 ' Stressing the
debtor-protection function of the automatic stay, the court stated that
emotional distress damages should be awarded as long as there is a
causal link between the willful violation and the harm, regardless of
financial loss.

7

'

Therefore, the prior lower court decisions offered no

standard for the award of emotional distress damages, but left this task
for the Eleventh Circuit in Lodge.
IV. CouRT's RATIONALE

In Lodge, interpreting and applying § 362(k), the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the present issue was whether actual damages can be read
to encompass emotional distress damages and, if so, what evidentiary
requirements may substantiate such a claim.73 In its examination of
these issues, the court considered decisions made by four of its "sister

65.

In re Washington, 172 B.R. at 415; In re Flynn, 169 B.R. at 1007.

66. 169 B.R. at 1023.
67. Id.
68. 172 B.R. at 418, 427. In In re Matthews, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Alabama depicted the plaintiffs' cases in In re Flynn and In re
Washington as being at two polar ends in terms of deservomg emotional distress damages.
See In
69.
70.
71.

re Matthews, 184 B.R. at 601.
296 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
Id. at 895-96.
Id.

72. Id. at 897. The court awarded emotional distress damages to compensate the
plaintiff for the "fear, anguish, and intense personal humiliation" he felt due to others
becoming aware of his situation and his "heightened distress over the threat of
incarceration." Id. at 896.
73. Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1268.
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circuits" and agreed with their interpretation that actual74damages, as
defined in § 362(k), included those for emotional distress.
In its consideration of the other circuits' decisions, the court highlighted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Aiello that required a financial
injury, and Judge Posner's warning that emotional distress damages
should be highly scrutinized as they are "easy to manufacture."7 5 In
addition, the court noted the focus on specificity displayed in Kaneb and
In re Repine and the need for more than generalized assertions of
emotional distress.7 6 Finally, the court went into an in-depth discussion of the test put forth in In re Dawson." In that discussion, the
court noted the Ninth Circuit's explanation of how a plaintiff may
establish emotional distress through "medical evidence or non-expert
7
testimony" corroborating the "manifestations of... mental anguish." 1
The court also focused on the Ninth Circuit's statements that some cases
may not require corroborating evidence if the acts by the party violating
79
the stay are so egregious that emotional distress is "readily apparent."
In ruling on the claims in Lodge, the Eleventh Circuit joined its four
sister circuits by deciding emotional distress damages are within the
meaning of actual damages."0 However, the court limited the availability of such damages by implementing a standard for when those
damages may be awarded based on a willful violation of the automatic
stay.81 The Eleventh Circuit held that, at a minimum, in order to
recover emotional distress damages under the § 362(k), plaintiffs must
have "(1) suffer[ed] significant emotional distress, (2) clearly establish[ed] the significant emotional distress, and (3) demonstrated[d] a
distress] and the [creditor's]
causal connection between [the emotional
82
stay."
automatic
the
of
violation
willful

74. Id. at 1269-71. The court points out that the First Circuit did not evaluate the
legislative history of § 362. Id. at 1269.
75. Id. at 1269-70 (quoting Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880).
76. See id. (determining the In re Repine decision to be an advancement of the decision
in Kaneb).
77. Id. at 1270-71. The court discussed the test proffered in In re Dawson that stated
to recover emotional distress damages a plaintiff must (1) prove he suffered significant
harm and not mere "[flleeting or trivial anxiety or distress"; (2) clearly establish the
significant harm; and (3) establish a causal relationship between the violation of the
automatic stay and the significant harm. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Dawson,
390 F.3d at 1149).
78. Id. at 1271.
79. Id. (quoting In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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The court then applied its newly minted standard.8 3 First, the court
ruled that the Lodges had not sufficiently alleged that they had suffered
significant emotional distress.' In so ruling, the court noted that the
Lodges learned of the publication of the Notice and the potential for
foreclosure only through letters from attorneys.' However, the Lodges
failed to file these letters or even to specify when they were received.'
Therefore, the court was unable to determine when the Lodges learned
of the Notice or how long they held the mistaken belief that foreclosure
The court classified the Lodges' allegations of
was imminent.8 7
emotional distress as "generalized" and lacking "specific detail."8 The
Lodges' allegations failed to show their harm rose beyond "[fileeting or
trivial anxiety or distress" to reach the level of significant emotional
distress.'
Next, the court analyzed the Lodges' proffered evidence to determine
if they had "clearly establish[ed] the significant emotional distress."'
The court noted that the Lodges did not present any medical evidence
or corroborating evidence of any kind other than their own affidavits. 9
In addition, the court determined the Lodges failed to present evidence
that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently egregious to warrant an
award of emotional distress damages absent corroborating evidence.92
According to the court, there was no evidence to support the notion that
the defendants had intended to harm the Lodges, especially since the
canceled the Notice's publication after it ran for only one
defendants
93
day.
Finally, the court determined that the Lodges had failed to present a
causal relationship between the harm they experienced and the actions
of Kondaur and McCalla.94 The Lodges did allege they visited a doctor
concerning their stress after the receipt of the letters informing them of
the foreclosure.9 5 However, the Lodges failed to present corroborating
evidence of these doctor visits or evidence proving that their maladies

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1271-72.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149).
Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were not present prior to the defendants' willful violation of the
automatic stay.6 In addition, it was impossible for the court to
determine how soon after this incident the maladies began.97 As a
result, the court decided that there was no evidence to definitively
support the proposition that the publication of the Notice caused the
Lodges' alleged emotional distress."
Although the court determined that the Lodges complaints did not
meet the standard for an award of emotional distress damages, it did not
approach the issue of whether a financial or physical injury was required
for such an award. 99 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit's decision put
forth a definitive statement that emotional damages do qualify as actual
damages within the meaning of § 362(k). 10° In addition, the court put
forth initial criteria that a plaintiff's complaint must meet to warrant
such an award. 1 However, the court's standard was vague regarding
what may suffice to meet this standard. 0 2
V. IMPLICATIONS
In analyzing the decision in Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., one
must be conscious of the compensatory function of the automatic stay
and § 362(k). With this in mind, the first two prongs of the test require
a plaintiff to (1) allege that they suffered harm that is worthy of
compensation, and (2) sufficiently prove this allegation.' 3 Therefore,
the first prong concerns the harm being alleged, and the second prong
concerns the evidentiary requirements. " The test leaves questions
regarding what may be considered "significant" emotional distress. In
addition, no answer is provided as to how it may properly be alleged and
what evidence may suffice to "clearly" establish this harm. The third
prong of the test requires the plaintiff to prove the creditor-defendant
caused the emotional distress, and therefore should be required to pay
compensation.' °5 Like the other elements of the test, no definable
method of proving causation is available; therefore, one must look to
other areas of law for answers. The following suggestions and elements

96. Id.
97.

Id.

98. Id.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See id. at 1271-72.
See id. at 1271.
See id. at 1271-72.
Lodge, 760 F.3d at 1271.
Id.
Id.
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pulled from both past bankruptcy cases and cases from other areas of
law will aid in filling in the gaps left by the decision in Lodge.
The Eleventh Circuit nobly attempted to define when emotional
distress damages may be granted for willful violations of the automatic
stay in a bankruptcy proceeding; however, the decision leaves questions
and indecision regarding how practitioners should apply this test. Past
bankruptcy cases may aid in filling these gaps, but they leave much to
be desired. Therefore, it may be helpful to look to the approach of other
areas of law to emotional distress damages, particularly contract and
tort law. This has been done in other case law relevant to bankruptcy
proceedings. For example, decisions considering allegations of emotional
distress stemming from violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) °6 have considered other areas of law, including tort law,
contract law, and constitutional law.1 °7 FDCPA claims, like bankruptcy, involve financial matters, and the law is rooted in federal statutory
law.'0 8 Therefore, how courts approach claims for emotional distress
in FDCPA cases is particularly relevant to bankruptcy cases due to the
similarity in both the substance of the claims and the nature of the
relevant law.
In tort law, the stringent standards required for claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress are especially useful in assessing the first
two prongs of the Lodge test: whether the emotional distress was
significant and whether it was clearly established. The requirements for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are similar to the requirements in Lodge but somewhat more concrete. 09 When faced with

106.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692 (2012).

107. See, e.g., Ford v. Consigned Debts & Collections, Inc., No. 09-3102 (NLH) (AMD),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135385 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2010); McNally v. Client Serve., No. 061104, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50456 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2008); Myers v. LHR, Inc., 543 F.
Supp. 2d 1215 (S.D. Cal. 2008); see also Greenpoint Credit Corp. v. Perez, 75 S.W.3d 40
(Tex. App. 2002) (looking to other areas of law when confronted with an attempt to recover
emotional distress damages under a Texas statute similar to FDCPA).
108. See McNally, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50456, at *3-4 ("The [FDCPA was enacted
. with the intent of providing individual protections against{] the use of deceptive,
misleading and/or unfair practices in the collection of consumer debt." (citation omitted)).
109. See Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1994)
(placing a stringent standard on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
order to avoid fraudulent claims); UPS v. Moore, 238 Ga. App. 376, 377, 519 S.E.2d 15, 17
(1999). However, critics still contend that what constitutes outrageous conduct and severe
distress supporting a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is primarily a
subjective question and is highly dependent upon the court's factual analysis of an
individual case. See Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So. 2d 410,414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see
also John J. Kircher, The FourFaces of Tort Law: Liabilityfor EmotionalHarm, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 789, 798 (2007).
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claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Georgia courts
require that a plaintiff prove the following: (1) the conduct was
intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)
the wrongful conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress is severe. °
In contract law, the foreseeability element and strict requirements for
the award of emotional distress damages..1 are particularly useful in
approaching the causation element of the Lodge decision.
First, a plaintiff must provide specific allegations that they suffered
In establishing that the harm
significant emotional distress. 2
suffered was "significant," the plaintiff must properly allege the
emotional distress." 3 In Lodge, the court focused on the need for a
plaintiff to provide specific information and not mere generalized
assertions."' Based on this language, in order to gain damages for
emotional distress, a plaintiff will have to provide more than mere veiled
alleging the emotional distress and its
assertions by 11specifically
5
manifestations.
In tort law, emotional distress is considered severe, and therefore
warranting compensation, when it is justified under the circumstances
and a reasonable person would not be expected to endure it."'
Applied to a willful violation of the automatic stay, a plaintiff-debtor
may attempt to establish significant emotional distress by establishing
that the emotional distress was justified based on the circumstances and
an ordinary debtor could not be expected to endure it. Some situations
are expected to cause a certain amount of fear or stress, and as a result,
individuals are expected to be hardened to a certain level of stress. 7

110. Jarrard v. UPS, 242 Ga. App. 58, 59, 529 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2000); see Atakpa, 912
F. Supp. at 1577.
111.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

353, cmt. A (1981).

112. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1269.
115. See id. at 1272.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. j (1965). The Restatement (Second)
of Torts also states that the emotional distress may not be "exaggerated and unreasonable"
based on the circumstances. Id. In addition, it may not be a result of a plaintiffs peculiar
susceptibility to emotional distress unknown to the actor. Id. Emotional distress includes
"highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." Id.
117. See id. In tort law, an individual is expected to be hardened to some harsh
language or occasional inconsiderate behavior by others and therefore ordinary stresses will
not support a recovery of emotional distress damages. See Jarrard,242 Ga. App. at 59,
529 S.E.2d at 147. Fear or stress may support an award of emotional distress damages but
it must be beyond that incidentally expected based on a particular scenario or circumstance
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Bankruptcy, and other financial proceedings, are such situations where
a certain level of fear, anxiety, and stress is expected. 18 Therefore, a
plaintiff must prove there is something extraordinary about the
emotional distress that would distinguish it from that ordinarily
expected in a bankruptcy proceeding."19
The court may consider many factors in looking at this element. In
order to establish the emotional distress was warranted based on the
circumstances, a plaintiff will need to specifically allege facts regarding
the cause of his emotional distress: the actions of the creditor. 2 '
Though not required, emotional distress is more likely to be considered
significant when a financial injury or a physical manifestation of the
emotional distress is alleged. 2 ' The emotional distress must be more
than "fleeting" so the duration of the plaintiff's stress can greatly affect
whether it is "significant." 122 Plaintiffs, therefore, would be wise to

and be accompanied by some evidence. See Grantham v. Vanderzyl, 802 So. 2d 1077, 1081
(Ala. 2001) (concluding that a nurse's fear of contracting disease due to HIV exposure was
incidental to employment and not severe despite the wrongful actions of a doctor); Thomas
v. BSE Indus. Contractors, 624 So. 2d 1041, 1046 (Ala. 1993); cf. Johnson v. Fambrough,
706 So. 2d 739, 741, 743 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (concluding that an employee's distress over
employer's racist language not sufficiently severe as harsh language may be expected in
the workplace).
118. See In re Vol, 512 B.R. at 140 (finding that the debtors' harm was not "distinct
from that which arose ...from the bankruptcy process").
119. See id. A plaintiffs mental and emotional anxiety resulting from fear of
foreclosure on loans may be severe emotional distress to support a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, No. 5:11-CV284 (CAR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16193, *14-15 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012). However, a
plaintiffs experience of stress and anxiety due to the collection practices of a creditor may
not support recovery on its own. See Chung v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 975 F. Supp.
2d 1333, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2013). This is true even if the plaintiff can allege financial and
physical injury. See id. at 1340-41. In Chung, the District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia found that the plaintiffs emotional distress was not severe despite her financial
injury, loss of personal possessions, and allegation of a serious stomach problem. Id. at
1340-41, 1350.
120. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271-72. In Lodge, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Lodges failed to provide the letters that allegedly caused the emotional distress, making
it difficult to analyze the actions of the creditor. Id. at 1272.
121. See Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga. App. 335, 337, 441 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1994) (holding
that the actions of the defendant had to be proven willful, wanton, or malicious as there
was no physical or pecuniary injury alleged); see also Ob-Gyn Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton,
259 Ga. 663, 666, 386 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1989) (discussing physical harm in the context of
the impact rule); Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46-47 (describing the plaintiffs physical manifestations of emotional damage).
122. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149; see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc.,
176 Ga. App. 227, 231, 335 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1985); Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46-47 (discussing
the duration of the plaintiffs injury, specifically that the injury would continue in the
future). The Eleventh Circuit in Lodge mentioned its inability to determine the duration
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include specific details regarding the date and time of the actions of the
creditor and the resultant emotional distress. Courts may also consider
whether the alleged emotional distress novel or a mere continuation of
a pre-existing condition. 12' When a plaintiff alleges they were forced
to seek out professional or medical attention, it supports the assertion
that their emotional distress was significant.1 ' Conversely, when a
plaintiff has failed to seek help for their allegedly "severe" emotional
distress, their claims have often failed.' 25
In an attempt to prevent frivolous claims, the Eleventh Circuit
requires a plaintiff, after he specifically alleges that he suffered
significant emotional distress, to clearly establish the emotional
distress. 126 Although the court did not provide an evidentiary standard in Lodge, it did criticize the lack of corroborating evidence put forth
by the Lodges, including the dearth of medical or physical evidence and
evidence of the creditors' actions.127 The court emphasized that the
only corroborating evidence provided by the plaintiffs in the case was
Additionally, the plaintiff-debtor failed to
their own affidavits."
supply corroborating evidence of either the event that caused the alleged
emotional distress (the receipt of the letters) or the emotional distress
itself.129 In addition, it is important to note that the Eleventh Circuit
failed to reach the issue of whether a plaintiff must provide corroborating evidence of a financial injury.' 30
A majority of courts have denied the award of emotional distress
damages when the plaintiff lacked corroborating evidence.' 3 ' Therefore, evidence to substantiate one's claims is essential, and courts have
looked favorably on certain types of evidence. For instance, although not
all courts have followed the Seventh Circuit's lead and required financial
loss as a prerequisite, courts have reasoned that evidence of a financial

of the plaintiffs' alleged emotional distress as a reason for denying an award. 750 F.3d at
1272.
123. See Bridges, 176 Ga. App. at 231, 335 S.E.2d at 448-49.
124. See Jones v. Warner, 301 Ga. App. 39, 43, 686 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2009); Odem v.
Pace Acad., 235 Ga. App. 648, 656, 510 S.E.2d 326, 333 (1998); Bridges, 176 Ga. App. at
231, 335 S.E.2d at 448.
125. Id.
126. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271; accord In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149; see also
Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880.
127. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1272.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Stinson v. Bi-Rite Rest. Supply Inc. (In re Stinson), 295 B.R. 109, 120 n.8
(BAP. 9th Cir. 2003); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 463 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).
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loss may support a claim for damages for emotional distress.'32
Perhaps the strongest corroborating evidence a plaintiff may present is
medical evidence of physical injuries, evidence of consultation with
medical professionals, or testimony from medical experts. 3 When the

plaintiff seeks psychological help, the resultant testimony, or the mere
fact they were forced to seek psychological treatment, weighs even
heavier in the determination of emotional distress damages.'. 3 In
addition, a plaintiff may evince the manifestations of their emotional

distress through third-party corroborating testimony of family members,
friends, or coworkers.'35
Certain factors may alter a court's decision-making on the first two
steps of the analysis: whether the emotional distress was significant and
whether it was clearly established.' 36 These factors notably include
the egregiousness of the creditor's actions and the circumstances of the
3 7
When the creditor's actions are found to be especially
debtor."
egregious on their own or based on the circumstances, courts may apply
a less stringent test and find the presence of significant emotional
distress based on the well-pled allegations of the plaintiff"'3 In such

132. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149; In re Repine, 536 B.R. at 521; contraAiello,
239 F.3d at 880 (requiring a financial injury to support an award of damages for emotional
distress).
133. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50. When analyzing claims of emotional
distress in the debt-collection context, courts have also favored the availability of medical
evidence or testimony from medical experts. See Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46-47. In Perez, the
plaintiffs anguish caused her to seek out Sheriff Barrera, who "testified she was crying and
extremely upset." Id. at 46. In addition, Perez's doctor testified she suffered painful
blisters and sores among other physical problems caused by stress. Id.
134. See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 957-58
(9th Cir. 2011); McGinnis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16193, *14-15 (discussing damages award
for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). In McCullough, the plaintiff
presented evidence of emotional distress through his own testimony and testimony from
a clinical psychologist. 637 F.3d at 957-58.
135. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50; see also Varela v. Quinones (In re
Quinones Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 821-21 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002). Courts in debt-collection
cases have also favored these types of corroborating testimony. See Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 4647. In Perez,the Texas Court of Appeals considered testimony from the plaintiffs daughter
as well as a policeman she sought out. Id. The plaintiffs daughter testified that her
mother had experienced trouble sleeping at night and corroborated her mother's mental
anguish over the threat of being put in jail, her embarrassment from the ordeal, and her
inability to stay alone at home. Id.
136. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1149-50.
137. Id. at 1150.
138. See Alston v. King, 231 F.3d 383,388-89 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because
the defendant had not engaged in "the type of inherently degrading conduct that would
portend emotional distress," the plaintiffs allegations, without more, were insufficient to
justify recovery); In re Flynn, 169 B.R. at 1021-23.
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situations, when causation is proven, courts may grant emotional
distress damages despite a lack of corroborating evidence. 3 9 However,
plaintiffs must still provide evidence of the actions of the creditor, and
their award typically has been minimal.'4 ° When considering claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts have stated that
egregious behavior is that which is beyond the "bounds of decency" or
what would be expected based on the circumstances."' In bankruptcy,
this would presumably eliminate ordinary violations of the automatic
stay from being considered egregious. 42 Therefore, if a debtor can

139. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150-51; In re Flynn, 169 B.R. at 1023; In re
Wagner, 74 B.R. 898, 905 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). Georgia courts have found that a
defendant may be liable for emotional distress damages, despite no evidence of a physical
or financial injury, when it is proven that his actions were malicious, willful, or wanton.
See Ob-Gyn Assocs. of Albany, 259 Ga. at 666, 386 S.E.2d at 149; Westview Cemetery, Inc.
v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 544, 216 S.E.2d 776, 779; Evans, 212 Ga. App. at 337, 441
S.E.2d at 773.
140. See Ford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135385, at *15-17, *21 (awarding plaintiff $250
in actual damages); In re Wagner, 74 B.R. at 905 (awarding plaintiff $100).
Those cases also show that awards for actual damages are minimal for emotional
distress absent any indication that mental health treatment has been obtained or
that the emotional distress has concretely affected a plaintiffs personal or
professional life. Moreover, even in cases where a plaintiff has suffered
permanent personal and professional damages, the damages awarded] are
relatively small, particularly in comparison to plaintiffs $50,000 request.
Ford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135385, at *16-17.
141. See Johnson, 788 So. 2d at 412. In considering intentional infliction of emotional
distress, or the similar tort of outrage, the egregiousness of a defendant's actions is
determined by analysis of whether (1) the defendant abused a position of power; (2) the
defendant emotionally harmed a plaintiff who was known to be particularly vulnerable; (3)
the defendant's conduct was made intolerable by his continuing it or repeating it numerous
times; (4) the defendant committed or threatened violence or serious economic harm to an
individual or property that the plaintiff had a known special interest in. Kircher, supra
note 109, at 803. In Georgia, the egregiousness of the defendant's actions is determined
by weighing non-dispositive factors including: any special relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant in which the defendant exerted some sort of control over the
plaintiff, a plaintiffs susceptibility to emotional distress that the defendant was aware of
at the time of acting, and the severity of the harm caused by the conduct. See Clark v.
Arras, 212 Ga. App. 695, 696, 443 S.E.2d 277,279 (1994) (holding that a doctor's action of
performing an autopsy on a stillborn child was not egregious); see also St. Mary's Hosp. v.
Radiology Profl Corp., 205 Ga. App. 121, 123-24, 421 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1992) (concluding
that, despite holding a position of power, an employer's threatening conduct in contract
negotiations was not egregious).
142. Typical willful violations of the automatic stay are "sloppy business practices," and
therefore, under this standard, would not be considered egregious. See Chung, 975 F.
Supp. 2d at 1350; see also Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1265; In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1144-45;
Kareb, 196 F.3d at 266-67. When a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
made, "[s]harp or sloppy business practices, even if in breach of contract, are not generally
considered as going beyond all reasonable bounds of decency as to be utterly intolerable in
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specifically allege and provide evidence of outrageous creditor conduct,
or that the debtor is in a particularly vulnerable position beyond what
is expected in a bankruptcy proceeding, courts may consider the
emotional distress apparent, diluting the Eleventh Circuit's stringent
standard.
Lastly, the third prong of the Lodge test requires plaintiffs to prove a
causal relationship between the creditor's actions and the emotional
Beyond the inherent difficulties involved in a nondistress.'4 3
corporeal injury, the nature of willful violations of the automatic stay
make proving causation more difficult. Emotional distress injuries due
to breaches of contract are analogous to this situation. Contract law,
As a
like bankruptcy, disfavors damages for emotional distress.'
result, contract law requires either a physical injury from the breach or
that the breach, be of "such a kind that serious emotional disturbance
was a particularly likely result" for emotional distress damages to be
awarded.'4 5 These requirements limit the award of emotional distress
damages to situations where they are foreseeable.' 46
Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking emotional distress damages for a
violation of the automatic stay may prove causation by establishing that
the emotional distress was foreseeable. The question is how this may be
done. This inquiry is made more difficult by the fact that a debtor is
expected to incur emotional distress when in a poor financial state and
enduring the rigors of the bankruptcy process. 47 In addition, willful
violations of the automatic stay are not uncommon in bankruptcy
Therefore, a plaintiff must
proceedings and can be quite benign. 4

a civilized community." Chung, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 1350 (alteration in original) (quoting

Moore, 238 Ga. App. at 378, 519 S.E.2d at 17); see also Discovery Point Franchising v.
Miller, 234 Ga. App. 68, 73, 505 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1998); Evans, 212 Ga. App. at 337, 441
S.E.2d at 773; Fulton v. Anchor Say. Bank, 215 Ga. App. 456, 456-59, 469,452 S.E.2d 208,

210-12, 218 (1994).
143. Lodge, 760 F.3d at 1271.
144.
145.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt.
Id.

146. Id. In tort law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in accordance

with the standard put forth in Lodge, the emotional distress of the plaintiff must be
foreseeable. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Novotny, 657 So. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In most torts, Georgia courts have traditionally followed the so-called
"impact rule," which requires the plaintiff to have been physically impacted in some way
as a result of defendant's conduct for a claim for emotional distress to lie. See Lee v. State

Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 586, 533 S.E.2d 82, 85 (2000); Ob-GynAssocs. of Albany,
259 Ga. at 665, 386 S.E.2d at 148.
147. See In re Baker, 18 B.R. 243, 246 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1982).
148. See, e.g., In re Wassem, 456 B.R. 566; In re Bishop, 296 B.R. 890; In re Poole, 242
B.R. 104; In re Davis, 201 B.R. 835; In re Matthews, 184 B.R. 594; In re Washington, 172
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provide evidence that the defendant's willful violation of the automatic
stay goes beyond that normally expected, making significant emotional
distress foreseeable and compensation warranted.'4 9 Borrowing from
the approach in contract law, emotional distress may be proven to have
been foreseeable based on the presence of injury or the nature of the
creditor's actions.
Financial injury in a bankruptcy proceeding is analogous to a physical
injury resulting from breach of contract. Therefore, a plaintiff may
establish causation by proving he experienced a financial injury that
would cause a reasonable person to experience emotional distress. 5 °
However, there will not always be a financial injury as a result of a
violation of the automatic stay. The general rule in contract is that
when there is no physical injury a court must look at the content of the
contract to see if it is the type of "personal contract[]" from which
emotional distress would be reasonably foreseeable upon breach.' 5 '
When considering a violation of the automatic stay, a court could
consider the nature of the creditor's actions and whether the actions are
of the sort from which emotional distress would be expected.'5 2 This
can be done in two ways: (1) based on the circumstances of the debtor;
or (2) based on the egregiousness of the creditor's actions.'53
First, the circumstances of the debtor may be such that any wrongful
violation on the part of a creditor may be expected to cause emotional
distress.5 For example, courts have considered personal qualities of
the debtor or life circumstances as making some debtors particularly
susceptible to emotional distress because they lack the ability to protect
themselves in a bankruptcy proceeding.'55 Second, when the actions

B.R. 415; In re Flynn, 169 B.R. 1007; In re Baker, 18 B.R. 243.
149. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271-72.
150. This will be a fact-sensitive evaluation. See Lodge, 750 F.3d at 1271-72.
151. Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, PA., 505 F.3d 1173, 1200-01 (11th Cir. 2007).
152. See Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816,823 (Mich. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt.

153. See In re Dawson, 390 F.3d at 1150; Thomas v. Nat'l Bus. Assistants, Inc., No.
N82-469, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24876, at *3-5 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1984); Perez, 75 S.W.3d

at 46-47.
154. See Thomas, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24876, at *3-5.
155. See Boyce v. Attorney's Dispatch Serv., No. C-3-94-347, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12970, at *5-7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 1999); Thomas, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24876, at *3-5;

Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46-47. In these cases, courts noted advancing age, a demonstrated
history of anxiety and nervousness, language barriers, cultural differences, a lack of
education, and vulnerable circumstances such as pregnancy and a new marriage as placing
debtors in a position that made emotional distress foreseeable. Similarly, in tort law, a
defendant may be liable for emotional distress damages when he acts in a manner that he
can foresee would cause emotional distress due to a particular sensitivity of the plaintiff.
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of a creditor are so egregious that a reasonable person would expect
them to cause emotional distress, causation may be found even without
direct evidence linking the creditor's act and the debtor's emotional distress. 156 In tort law, courts have defined egregious actions as those
beyond what a decent society would accept and would, as a result,
naturally give rise to emotional distress.157 In Georgia, behavior is
considered atrocious or egregious when the behavior would naturally
cause "intense feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme
outrage" that would make severe emotional distress foreseeable. 58
Egregious behavior from which emotional distress is foreseeable does not
include mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, slight oppressions,
or other mishaps of a plaintiff's daily life."5 9 However, egregious
behavior can include a creditor's actions in financial proceedings.6 0

See La Porte v. Associated Indep., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1964) (considering the
plaintiffs history of nervousness); Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 38-39 (La. 1920);
Kircher, supra note 109, at 800. A plaintiffs pre-existing medical condition or susceptibility will not affect the foreseeability analysis unless the defendant was aware of the malady
at the time he acted. See Moore, 238 Ga. App. at 378, 519 S.E.2d at 17; Bridges, 176 Ga.
App. at 230, 335 S.E.2d at 448.
156. See Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46. For example, in Perez, the Texas Court of Appeals
determined that the defendant creditor's action of threatening jail time was of such an
egregious nature to find causation of emotional distress damages. Perez, 75 S.W.3d at 46.
Although there was corroborating evidence, the egregious act made emotional distress
foreseeable as the "threat of being put in jail is calculated to put fear and anxiety into
every citizen's heart. It is the very tool used by our justice system to control bad behavior
in our society." Id.
157. See St. Mary's Hosp., 205 Ga. App. at 123-24, 421 S.E.2d at 734 (concluding that
the defendant's behavior in contract negotiations would not foreseeably cause severe
emotional distress); Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121,404 S.E.2d 442,444 (1991);
Bridges, 176 Ga. App. at 229-30, 335 S.E.2d at 447-48; Thomas v. Ronald A. Edwards
Constr. Co., 163 Ga. App. 202, 205, 293 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1982); Kircher, supra note 109,
at 858. In Florida, courts have defined emotional distress as being "beyond the bounds of
decency and.., utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Novotny, 657 So. 2d at 1212.
158. St. Mary's Hosp., 205 Ga. App. at 123, 421 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting Moses v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 222, 225, 369 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1988)).
159. Jarrard,242 Ga. App. at 59-60, 529 S.E.2d at 147-48; see Fambrough,706 So. 2d
at 741.
160. A plaintiff may foreseeably experience emotional distress from a defendant's
intentional wrongful foreclosure but not from the mere initiation of foreclosure proceedings.
See, e.g., Blue View Corp. v. Bell, 298 Ga. App. 277, 279-80,679 S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (2009);
DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 291 Ga. App. 444, 448-49, 662 S.E.2d 141, 147-48
(2008); Ingram v. JIK Realty Co., 199 Ga. App. 335, 337,404 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1991); Clark
v. West, 196 Ga. App. 456, 457-58, 395 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1990). In addition, emotional
distress may foreseeably result from threatening collection practices but not from mere
ordinary collection practices such as phone calls and threats of repossession. Compare
Bourne v. Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C., 998 F. Supp. 2d 495, 507-08 (S.D. W. Va. 2014);
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38, 45 (Ala. 1990); with McGinnis
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Some bankruptcy courts have found egregiousness in a creditor's
planned course of deliberate and malicious harassment.16 1 Therefore,
either by establishing the circumstances of the debtor or the egregiousness of the creditor's actions, a plaintiff may establish causation absent
a financial injury. With these suggestions, practitioners may be able to
fill in the gaps left by the decision in Lodge.162
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp.
provided a framework and a definable standard from which courts and
practitioners may approach claims for emotional distress damages in
bankruptcy proceedings.' 6 3
However, the decision comes short of
providing a definitive answer on what a plaintiff must prove to be
awarded damages for emotional distress and leaves open the potential
for litigation abuse.' 64 As discussed, bankruptcy is not merely a
financial procedure. The purpose of bankruptcy, as shown by the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, is to ensure not only the
protection of creditors and their interests but also that the debtor is
protected and given the opportunity for a fresh start. 165 The equity
intended in bankruptcy proceedings will be furthered by allowing a
debtor with a worthy claim to be compensated when he is aggrieved by
a creditor's willful violation of the automatic stay. However, as
expressed by the renowned Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Aiello v. ProvidianFinancialCorp., both the availability of
emotional distress damages and the frequency of willful violations of the
automatic stay could potentially cause a flood of frivolous claims.1 6
As a result, the requirements of the standard in the Lodge decision need
to be clarified so that the compensatory function of bankruptcy can reach
its full intent while also preventing any distortion of that purpose.
Drawing from other areas of law and past bankruptcy cases, as this Note

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16193, at 13-15.
161. In re Baker, 18 B.R. at 244-45. In New York, if a creditor's actions are found to
be a part of systematically planned harassment, threats, or "a deliberate and malicious
campaign of harassment or intimidation," such as repeated "[albusive, obscene and
threatening phone calls," then causation can be presumed because emotional distress would
be foreseeable from such acts. Id. (quoting Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765,
770 (N.Y. 1970)).
162. See 750 F.3d at 1271-72.
163. See id. at 1271.
164. See id. at 1271-72.
165. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97; see also S. Rep.
No. 95-989, at 54-55, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41.
166. 239 F.3d at 881.
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has suggested, would allow for a more thorough and proper approach to
claims of emotional distress damages for willful violations of the
automatic stay.
H. THOMAS SHAW
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